We evaluate three ECB policies involving government bond purchases, the Securities Market Programme (SMP), the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), and the 3-year Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) using an event-study approach. We find that the policies reduced sovereign bond yields through two main channels. The primary channel is a reduction in default risk. The second channel is through a market segmentation effect. We reach these conclusions by examining the dynamics of a collection of asset prices, including eurodenominated sovereign bond yields, dollar-denominated sovereign bond yields, corporate bond yields,; and credit default swap rates. The behavior of the spreads between different combinations of these asset prices reveals the channels at work. ECB policies aimed at reducing government bond yields also have beneficial macroeconomic spillovers. We show this by documenting increases in private asset values in both distressed and core countries.
I. Introduction
During the most intense periods of the European financial crisis, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (the "GIIPS" countries) saw large increases in their government bond yields. Figure 1 graphs 2-year yields for GIIPS government bonds from 2010 onward. Italian and Spanish yields peak around 7 pct in the fall of 2011, while Portuguese and Irish bonds peak around 20 pct. Greek 2-year yields rise above 200 pct prior to the Greek default in early 2012. In response, the ECB introduced programs aimed at lowering government bond yields on the presumption that such a reduction would have beneficial macroeconomic spillovers. The ECB programs included direct purchases of government debt, conditional commitments to purchase government debt, and loan extensions to banks in expectation that the banks would purchase government debt. The objective of our paper is to assess these programs and shed light on the economic mechanisms through which the programs may have worked. Did they succeed in lowering government bond yields and improving the macroeconomic outlook? What are the channels through which ECB policies worked?
II. Determinants of Government Bond Yields
Consider the government bond yield for maturity of country :
We have decomposed this bond yield into several components. The first and second components (top line) are not dependent on the identity of the country, . Denote as the overnight interest rate at time on a safe and liquid bond, such as the overnight EONIA rate. Then the first component is the expectations hypothesis component of bond yields. The second component reflects a term (or duration risk) premium associated with the bond. Since longer term bonds have interest rate risk, they likely carry a term premium. The next three components (second line) are country specific.
A high probability of default, , and a low fraction of recovery on default, , both lead to a high default premium. This is the solvency risk component of bond yields. Another way that bond yields may be high is through redenomination risk. If bond holders expect that rather than default on obligations, the government will choose to exit the Euro and redenominate its debt into a local currency at a depreciated exchange rate, then they will require a (Eq. 1) 3 redenomination premium. A high probability of redenomination, , and a low value of the redenominated currency, , both lead to a high redenomination premium.
Redenomination and default risk may be either exogenous or endogenous to the behavior of debt-holders and the sovereign. There are models of sovereign default that stress the two-way feedback between interest rates and default risk. If lenders place a high probability on sovereign default, they will require high interest rates, which will adversely affect the sovereigns' fiscal position and reinforce the default fears. For example, in Cole and Kehoe (2000) , the government rolls over short-term debt. If an investor fear that other investors will not rollover their debt, then they raise the interest rate they charge on debt, which in turn makes default more likely.
The last component of the bond yield arises from segmentation and illiquidity frictions. If investors differ in their valuation of a bond and some investors are constrained from participating in the market, the market price may reflect the valuation of a subset of the investor population and bond yields will reflect a segmentation factor compared with the frictionless case. For example, if local investors are relatively optimistic, or if they see benefits to holding local bonds above and beyond the bonds' cash-flow --say if the bonds are accepted as collateral at the ECB or they receive special regulatory treatment --then they are willing to hold bonds at relatively high prices, while other investors, whose valuation is lower, reduce their holdings to zero, but do not necessarily take a short position. This leads to and lower bond yields. Alternatively, if some high-valuation investors drop out of the market --say because of funding constraints --bonds will have to be held by low valuation investors, leading to and high bond yields. Note that the key assumption here is segmentation. If there are no segmentation frictions, then the bonds will be priced via the usual pricing kernel that applies to all assets, and the particular demands of some investors are irrelevant. Thus a key restriction is that there are limits to arbitrage as in Gromb and Vayanos (2002) .
These components are not independent. For example, expectations about the future path of interest rates and inflation may affect solvency, and hence default risk, through macroeconomic channels. Or, rising yields due to redenomination concerns can raise the risk of default as well.
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III. Description of ECB Programs
A. Securities Market Programme
On May 10, 2010, the ECB introduced the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) whereby the ECB directly purchased government debt of distressed countries.
1 ECB announcements did not indicate planned amounts of purchases. ECB total holdings under the SMP are graphed in Figure  2 . Up to July 2011, the purchases resulted in holdings of around EUR 75 billion of securities. It is our understanding that during this first phrase of the program only bonds of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal were purchased. On August 7, 2011, the ECB expanded the program. The second round of purchases included Italy and Spain. ECB holdings peaked at EUR 219.5 billion in February of 2012.
2 Table 1 Panel A details the distribution of purchases, by country and maturity, as of February 2013. Italy and Spain represent the largest amount of purchases. The average maturity of the holdings as of that time is around 4 years. Since purchases were made from May 2010-February 2012, with Italy and Spain purchases commencing in August 2011, the average maturity at purchase was up to 3 years higher for Portugal, Ireland and Greece and up to 1.5 years higher for Italy and Spain. This implies that the average maturity of ECB purchases was fairly comparable to the average maturity of debt outstanding (for example, OECD statistics report that the average term to maturity of government debt in 2010 was 7.2 years for Italy, 6.6 years for Spain, 5.8 year for Portugal, 5.9 years for Ireland, and 7.1 years for Greece).
3
In terms of the ECB's motivation for the SMP, the ECB's press release on May 10, 2010 stated (our emphasis added in italics):
``In view of the current exceptional circumstances prevailing in the market, the Governing Council decided [….] to conduct interventions in the euro area public and private debt securities markets (Securities Markets Programme) to ensure depth and liquidity in those market segments which are dysfunctional. The objective of this programme is to address the malfunctioning of securities markets and restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism.''
The Aug 7, 2011 release stated: In both cases, we note the ECB's reference to dysfunctional and illiquid market segments. We will study whether the government bond markets of the GIIPS countries were affected by segmentation/limits-to-arbitrage effects.
B. Outright Monetary Transactions
On September 6, 2012, the ECB introduced the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. The program had two key elements. First, under the OMT, the ECB could purchase government bonds of a given country, focusing on maturities between 1 and 3 years, and with no ex-ante quantitative limits. Second, a country had to apply for the OMT in which case it would also have to undertake a set of fiscal adjustments. That is, the program involved conditionality. As of today, no bonds have been purchased under the OMT program.
While the program was announced officially on September 6, there were earlier indications regarding the likelihood of such a program. On July 26, 2012, ECB President Mario Draghi stated at a conference that ``within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.'' Furthermore, the introductory statement of the ECB to the August 2, 2012 press conference stated:
``The Governing Council, within its mandate to maintain price stability over the medium term and in observance of its independence in determining monetary policy, may undertake outright open market operations of a size adequate to reach its objective. The OMT was motivated by perceived redenomination risk associated with the breakup of the Euro. For example, on December 6, 2012, Draghi stated:
"We said that the main aim of the OMT is to remove tail risk to overcome monetary and financial fragmentation of the euro area that would stem from a redenomination risk."
We will study whether redenomination risk was an important factor in the dynamics of the bond yields of GIIPS countries.
6
C. 3-Year Long-Term Refinancing Operations
On December 8, 2011, the ECB announced two 3-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs). The operation was an extension of the ECB's main lending to banks, the main refinancing operation (MRO), to 3 years. Under the LTRO, like the MRO, banks receive loans against a variety of collateral, subject to a collateral-specific haircut schedule. The loans were at a floating interest rate, tied to the ECB's policy rate. The lending was full allotment, meaning that banks did not face quantity limits on their borrowings.
The press release from the ECB stated:
``The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today decided on additional enhanced credit support measures to support bank lending and liquidity in the euro area money market. In particular, the Governing Council has decided to conduct two longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) with a maturity of 36 months and the option of early repayment after one year. ''
Because the interest rate on the LTRO is floating at the MRO rate, the difference between the LTRO and the regular MRO is actually quite subtle. Rolling over weekly MRO funding over 3 years produces the same interest rate cost as a 3-year LTRO loan. One potential advantage of the LTRO is that it alleviates concerns that the ECB could revert at some point to a fixedquantity variable-rate allotment policy that restricts funding quantities. The LTRO is similar to a firm commitment to provide a certain quantity of funding over a 3-year period. In any case, the take-up was substantial, and so banks must have perceived some benefit from taking out LTRO loans compared with rolling over MRO funding. The first allotment date for the LTRO was December 21, 2011. On this date, EUR 335 billion was borrowed by banks, from the ECB. The second allotment date was February 29, 2012, when EUR 448 billion was borrowed by banks. A substantial share of this borrowing volume was likely substitution from MRO to LTRO.
News prior to December 8, 2011 suggested the possibility of an action by the ECB. For example, the Financial Times on November 24, 2011 reports in a headline that the "ECB eyes longer-term loans for banks," although the article does not point to a specific ECB statement that allows us to pin down a prior event date. The clearest prior announcement from the ECB was on December 1, 2011, when Draghi speaks to the European Parliament and says that "we are aware of the scarcity of eligible collateral" [for banks] and suggests that the "the most important thing for the ECB is to repair the credit channel." The Financial Times reports on December 1, 2011 ("Draghi hints at eurozone aid plan") that markets interpreted the Draghi speech to indicate an expansion of SMP or a three-year LTRO.
Since we are interested in the impact of direct ECB government bond purchases or indirect purchased by banks induced by ECB lending, 
IV. Policy Impact: Event-Study Evidence
We evaluate the effects of the ECB policies using an event-study. We construct 2-day changes, from the end of the day prior to the event to the end of the day after the event, in asset prices around a set of event dates. Our event-study approach works only to the extent that we can be sure that market movements are largely due to program-relevant news. The dates we believe satisfy this criterion come from discussion of the programs in the previous section. For the SMP, we use May 10, 2010 and August 7, 2011. 4 For the OMT, we use July 26, 2012 , August 2, 2012 , and September 6, 2012 . For the LTRO, we use December 1, 2011 and December 8, 2011.
There is a great deal of non-LTRO economic news over the LTRO period that complicates inference. In Italy, Mario Monti unveils a fiscal plan of austerity on December 5, 2011 that appears to significantly impact asset prices. In Spain, Mariano Rajoy introduces a fiscal plan on December 19, 2011 that appears significant. There is further news regarding these plans and whether or not they will be passed that arrives over this period that likely have important effects on asset prices. As we will see, all of our event-study results for the LTRO suggest it had limited impact. This could be because the program was unsuccessful or could be because we have too few event dates during a period of high volatility, so that our methods have low power. In addition to the event-study, we also take a narrative approach and evaluate movements in bond yields over a longer window for the SMP, OMT, and LTRO. Under this approach, our evidence suggests that the LTROs have significant effects on bond yields.
The asset price changes around the event dates should be thought of as asset price reactions to changes in the probability of a given ECB program, rather than measures of the full magnitude of the effect of the ECB program. To the extent that we focus on only a few dates for each event which we are sure are program-relevant dates, it is likely that our measured magnitudes severely understate the impact of the program. The issue is likely most important for the LTRO where it is clear that news arrives continuously over a long interval, and we focus only on two dates. It is also important to keep in mind that the measured price changes reflect financial markets' initial assessment of these programs, which is not necessarily equal to the eventual impact of the program. ECB announcements about the SMP and OMT did not contain information about the likely magnitude, nor the distribution across countries or maturities, of intended purchases. Furthermore, banks' use of LTRO funds was also uncertain. Given this, our event study evidence should be interpreted as being driven by the market's perception about the likely outcome of the programs.
A. Effects on Bond Yields and Stock Prices
We study the impact of the ECB policies on government bond yields, corporate bond yields, and the stock markets of the GIIPS countries. We also consider the stock markets of the entire EMU area. We consider government bond yields from 6 months to 10 years, obtained from Bloomberg along with overall country level government bond index yields from Barclays obtained from Datastream. For some of the dates, we do not have data for some yield series (indicated as "ND" (no data) in the tables below). The stock returns are calculated using the MSCI indices obtained from Datastream. We break out the stock returns by country and by the financial versus non-financial sector. Table 2 reports 2-day changes in government bond yields around the SMP, OMT, and LTRO event dates. Bond yields fall in all of the countries for the SMP and OMT. The largest reductions are at the 2-and 5-year maturities. The reductions are generally significant at the 5% level (indicated by boldface). 5 For the LTROs, bond yields fall in Italy, Spain and Ireland, but 5 To assess statistical significance of the yield change for a particular policy announcement (for a given country and maturity) we regress (for each country) daily yield changes from 2010 to 2012 on policy announcement dummy variables. For each policy announcement (e.g. the first SMP announcement) the corresponding dummy variable is set to one on the event date and the following day and we test for the significance of this dummy variable. To assess statistical significance of yield change totals across several announcement dates for a given policy (e.g. the total impact of SMP for a given country, across the two announcements) we estimate the same regressions but use dummy variables set to one on days on which an announcement is made and one the first day after an announcement is made.
not Portugal and Greece. Given the volatility in Portugal and Greek bond yields over this period, it is possible that other news may have outweighed the LTRO effect on Greek bond yields. The yield changes for the LTROs are not significantly different from zero for any of the GIIPS countries. Table 3 Panel A reports changes in country level stock indices. For the SMP and OMT, stock returns rise across the board. For the LTROs, the stock return evidence is mixed with some countries experiencing positive returns and others experiencing negative returns, but almost none of the LTRO effects are statistically significant. In Panel B and C we break out the stock returns into financial sector stocks and non-financial stocks. We have seen in Table 2 that the ECB policies increased government bond prices. Since the financial sector holds a large amount of government bonds, it is likely that the financial sector stock returns are influenced by the direct gain on the value of bond holdings (see Acharya and Steffen, 2013) . In Table 4 we assess how much of the financial sector stock returns on the event dates can be explained by the gain on GIIPS sovereign bond holdings. The table is based on banks that both provided data to the EBA's 2011 stress tests and were publicly traded on the particular event date and we compare actual (value-weighted) stock returns for these banks to returns implied the change in the market value of their sovereign bond holdings. The number of banks varies between 34 and 37 across event dates, but since the banks in the EBA stress test are the largest ones in each country their stock returns are likely the key drivers of the country level financial sector stock returns (which are value-weighted). We calculate implied stock returns based on reported holdings of each of the GIIPS countries' sovereign bonds by maturity bucket, along with our documented yield changes by maturity from Table 2 . The table suggests that for many countries, only a small fraction of the large financial sector returns on the first SMP event date and the first and third OMT event dates can be explain by the increase in market value of GIIPS sovereign bonds held by financial institutions. The exceptions are Portugal, Greece, Germany and Belgium. For these countries the high implied financial sector stock returns on these event dates are driven by Banco BPI and Banco Comercial Portugues for Portugal, all 5 main banks for Greece, DZ Bank and Commerzbank for Germany, and Dexia for Belgium. In the sample of banks and event dates, the implied return has little explanatory power for actual returns. Instead, returns are much better explained by the bank's Beta on the Eurostoxx index (SXXT, a fairly broad index with about 300 firms included) multiplied by the realized 2-day return on this index around the particular event date. In a regression of 2-day stock returns using all seven announcement dates and all 37 banks, the stock returns implied by GIIPS sovereign bond holding have a small (near zero) and insignificant coefficient whereas Beta (estimated recursively using the past 120 days of returns) multiplied by the 2-day market return around the event has coefficient of 1.3 (significant at the 1 pct level). We do not include the regression in a table for brevity. This finding suggests that financial sector stock returns cannot be explained primarily by sovereign bond holdings but instead are likely to be driven by a more general impact of policies on the economies. 
B. Quantifying the Policy Impact
All three of the policies had a sizable impact in reducing government bond yields. The SMP and OMT policies particularly increase stock market values for both GIIPS and EMU countries.
We next do some simple calculations to assess potential welfare effects of the SMP and OMT. Table 6 reports the total change in stock market value and value of government debt (€ Billions), based on 2-day changes in asset prices, focusing on the SMP and OMT. From the table, we compute that the increase in the market value of GIIPS government bonds is €251 billion. The increase in the stock market value for GIIPS countries is €199 billion, while it is €750 billion for the EMU as a whole.
One metric for the benefit of these policies is the increase in asset values across the Euro area. One can view the change in the stock market value as a proxy for the change in present value of cash flows generated by the private sector (net of taxes), and the change in government bond values as a proxy for the change in the present value of cash flows to sovereign bond holders. The total market value increase in GIIPS government debt and EMU stock market is €1,001 billion (=€251 billion + €750 billion). As noted above, there is likely some double counting in this computation since the increase in government bond values directly increase in stock market values. A conservative approach to address this is to assume that 100% of the increase in government debt value is reflected in the stock market increase. In this case, the market value increase due to the policy is €750 billion. Alternatively we can use the Bruegel data from Table 1 Panel B to assess what fraction, f, of GIIPS sovereign debt is owned by GIIPS and core country banks and estimate the overall market value increase as (1-f)*€251 billion + €750 billion. Using resident bank holdings from the Bruegel data along with an estimate of the ratio of GIIPS plus core bank holdings to resident bank holdings from the data on the 2011 EBA stress test discussed above, we estimate that f varies between 25.7 pct and 37.9 pct across the GIIPS countries. If we set f to 1/3, we find a market value increase due to the SMP and OMT of €917 billion. This benefit is likely an underestimate because we implicitly assume that all banks are 11 publicly traded and, more importantly, because it neglects any market value changes for corporate debt and non-publicly traded firms, along with wage gains via reduced economic contraction.
The cost of the policy depends on the underlying problem addressed by the policies. If the underlying problem is one of multiple equilibria created by rollover risk, or if the problem is high bond yields cause by segmentation and illiquidity problems, then the ECB policies may cost zero, and could in theory turn a profit for the ECB. In the pure multiple equilibrium case, a policy announcement such as OMT rules out the bad equilibrium at zero cost. In the case where bond yields are high because of illiquidity/segmentation frictions, the SMP is profitable as the ECB earns an abnormal return on its purchases of bonds.
If the underlying problem is one of pure solvency, then these policies may have positive costs to the ECB (or to taxpayers from core countries). An upper bound on this cost is the increase in the market value of GIIPS government debt of €251 billion. Suppose that the SMP and OMT are viewed as signals that in the event of a sovereign (near-) default, there will be fiscal transfers from core countries to the affected countries. Then, the SMP and OMT lower bond yields because they reduce the default risk (i.e. increase ) of bond-holders. In this case, the expected fiscal transfer is equal to the increase in the value of GIIPS government debt.
The €251 billion number is thus an upper-bound cost to core-country taxpayers. To the extent that the holders of the GIIPS bonds are investors in the core countries, some of the increase in value of the GIIPS bonds cycles back to the core-countries. In other words, part of this number could reflect risk that is shifted from core bond investors (most likely financial institutions, to which core taxpayers are indirectly exposed) to core taxpayers.
A further caveat is that this calculation does not capture the potential costs to core taxpayers from future debt issues of GIIPS sovereigns that raise the amount of outstanding debt (rather than rolling over existing debt). If investors believe that fiscal transfers will be forthcoming in the event of a sovereign debt crisis, GIIPS countries could issue debt at higher prices. This fiscaltransfer-induced increase in the market value of future debt issues is not captured in our calculation. One can view the conditionality in the OMT program as an attempt to prevent such fiscal transfers induced by future debt issues. A related issue in terms of potential costs of the programs is whether the ECB has ``lost reputation'' in keeping inflation low. Figure 3 graphs a measure of 10-expected inflation for the euro area based on inflation swap contracts. While there are increase in expected inflation around some of the announcement dates expected 10-year inflation remains around 2% in 2013 suggesting that any such reputation loss has been small. 12 As noted above, the right way to look at these numbers is on a relative basis. The ratio of benefit to cost is at least €917/€251, indicating that the policies have been potent in improving the expected macroeconomic situation.
In the next sections, we evaluate the possible channels for the effects of ECB programs on asset prices. For data availability reasons we focus mainly in Italy, Spain and Portugal.
V. Channels for Policy Impact on Government Yields and Identification
A. Signaling and Duration Risk
Announcements regarding ECB government bond purchases may be taken as a signal of a more accommodative stance of the ECB. Thus the announcements may be taken as a signal reducing the future path of the policy rate, which can then have a direct effect in reducing government bond yields (i.e. reduce ∫ [ ] in eq. 1). This effect has been important for the US quantitative easing programs, as explained in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011).
Suppose that bond yields are high in part because of high duration (or term) risk premia. Then, if the ECB programs affect macroeconomic outcomes and thus alter macroeconomic risk, they may affect duration risk premia and hence lower longer term rates (i.e. reduce in eq. 1).
Note that both the signaling and duration risk channels are broad channels in that they will lower not only GIIPS government bond yields but also yields on core-country bonds and EONIA interest rate swaps. We do not separately identify the duration and signaling channels (they appear small in any case), and instead measure these channels, in sum, by using changes in the Euro swap rate (EONIA OIS swaps):
B. Default Risk
Suppose that the underlying reason that a GIIPS country's bond yields are high is the risk of insolvency. If ECB policies are viewed as signals that in the event of a sovereign default, fiscal transfers will be made from core countries to the affected countries, then, the policies lower bond yields because they increase the repayments of bond-holders. More broadly, any channel that lowers sovereign bond yields should lower default risk which then in turn lowers yields further. Default risk is in that sense an indirect channel, induced by other channels. In terms of 13 eq. (1), if any of the other four terms on the right hand side are reduced, this will endogenously lead to a reduction in the default term ( )
We will not separately measure exogenous and endogenous default risk. It is likely that both have played a part in the effects of ECB interventions.
We measure default risk ( ) in three ways. Our first and simplest approach, which is valid for Italy, is to study credit-default swap (CDS) rates. An important issue comes up in determining whether CDS rates are a measure of only ``regular'' default risk or whether CDS contracts may also cover losses from any currency redenomination. For Italy the issue is clear since the ISDA Master Agreement which governs CDS contracts explicitly states that for G7 countries CDS contracts do not cover losses from redenomination risk.
6 By contrast, for the other four GIIPS countries which are not G7 countries, CDS contracts would be presumed to cover losses from redenomination. Industry research letters confirm that this was the common perception in the market. For example, Credit Suisse (2010) states that `` by definition [of being a G-7 member] Italy, …, can re-denominate its government debt out of Euros into a new currency without triggering a restructuring, whereas Spain cannot (except in the extremely unlikely event it can keep a AAA rating through the process)''.
The main concern with using CDS rates to measure default risk is that it is possible that CDS rates are an underestimate of default risk to the extent that market participants believe that the CDS may not be triggered in all "default" events. In the period leading up to the Greek restructuring, there was considerable uncertainty around whether or not the restructuring would trigger CDS payouts (it ultimately did in March 2011). For example, on October 27, 2012 the ISDA determined that the European Union's agreement with banks for a ``voluntary'' 50 percent write down on their Greek bond holdings would be unlikely to trigger CDS payments. The news changed CDS rates and bond yields in a manner that is consistent with shifts in the likelihood of CDS payouts. 7 If concerns about CDS contracts paying off implies that CDS rates are only a fraction g of the true default risk, and if ECB policies do not change g, then CDS changes on event dates will underestimate the true reduction in default risk and thus ascribe more to the remaining terms in eq. (1).
Our second measure of default risk for euro-denominated bonds of a particular maturity is the yield on US dollar denominated foreign-law government bonds in excess of the US dollar swap rate (OIS) for a matched maturity, ( ). This approach can be implemented for all countries with dollar-denominated sovereign bonds (for which data can be obtained). Among the GIIPS countries this is Italy, Spain and Portugal. The idea behind this measure is that dollar denominated bonds cannot be redenominated. That is, given that they are denominated in dollars and governed by foreign law, the redenomination of the currency will have no impact on these bonds. We can write eq. 1 for a dollar denominated bond as,
( ) (i.e. no redenomination component) which implies that,
If default risk is similar for euro and dollar-denominated bonds, and if segmentation effects are small for dollar-denominated bonds, then we can use ( ) to measure ( ). To the extent there is less default risk in foreign law bonds than domestic bonds (e.g., domestic bonds are more likely to be restructured), this spread measure produces a lower bound on default risk of the regular (domestic law) government bonds.
8 With respect to segmentation it is certainly possible that is not near zero. However, since we are interested in changes in default risk around event dates we will obtain unbiased estimates of the default risk channel as long as policies do not systematically change segmentation for dollar-denominated bonds. Since the ECB bond purchases under the SMP to our knowledge has focused on euro-denominated bonds, and since dollar-denominated bonds were not accepted as collateral by the ECB when the 3-year LTROs were announced this assumption seems reasonable.
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Our last measure of default risk, which we use only for Portugal is based on comparing yields on government bonds and government "bills." Bills are securities issued with original maturity less than one year. We compare the yield on the bill to a bond that was originally issued at a longer 8 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) show that in the post WWII period, foreign debt fared somewhat better than domestic debt in terms of incidence of default. This was also borne out in the Greek restructuring in 2012, where some holders of foreign-law debt who did not participate in the restructuring were paid in full (Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati 2013) . 9 Collateral rules regarding dollar-denominated bonds changed on November 9, 2012, when the ECB resumed accepting foreign currency denominated collateral (this had also been done earlier in the crisis), subject to some further eligibility criteria (see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/html/questions2.en.html [retrieved on August 12, 2013] maturity but has aged to match the current maturity of the bill. This spread is informative about default risk because bills are typically senior to bonds in a default or restructuring event. Thus the spread is a lower bound measure of default risk. For example, in the Greek case, the bills were paid in full, while the bonds were subject to a large haircut. The differential treatment of bonds and bills stems from the Institute of International Finance's Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring (see IIF (2012)). These principles for sovereign debt restructuring are voluntary but they are endorsed by the G-20 countries. The principles do not imply literally no default risk for bills since bill holders could presumably face delay in payments during a restructuring (which would be costly in present value terms). However, such effects are likely small relative to the level of yields for Portugal. We do not have date to measure the bond-bill spread for Ireland or Greece.
C. Redenomination Risk
This channel is conceptually similar to default risk but works through the likelihood of redenomination,
We measure redenomination risk as follows. We construct ). Note that if we were to instead use government bonds to construct ( ), our measure would pick up both redenomination risk and segmentation effects. The segmentation effects for government, euro-denominated bonds are likely to change on policy announcements dates given that policies specifically target such bonds. We overcome this problem by estimating ( ) ( ) for corporate bonds, which should have the same redenomination risk as sovereign bonds (i.e., all euro-denominated domestic law bonds in a given country will be affected in a redenomination event). As long as policies do not affect the segmentation term for corporate bonds, changes in ( ) ( ) for corporates will give a valid estimate of the change in ( ) The fact that the SMP and OMT focus on sovereign bonds helps support this assumption. As for the LTROs, the assumption is more likely to be valid for non-financial firms than for financials, because such bonds are less subject to ECB effects.
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For Spain and Portugal, since the CDS contracts cover both default and redenomination risk, we cannot use CDS to measure ( ). We instead measure default by the spread ( ). For Spain and Portugal, we also follow a different approach to measuring redenomination risk. From eq. 3, we note that ( ) measures default risk (and segmentation risk for dollar bonds that is unlikely to be affected by ECB policies). We also note that,
Said differently, since the CDS covers redenomination risk for Spain and Portugal, while the USD bond yield does not reflect a redenomination risk premium, we can use the difference to measure redenomination risk.
D. Market Segmentation
If markets are segmented, then ECB purchases of sovereign bonds will increase the price of these bonds causing to fall. This occurs if the purchases are absorbed by a small number of market participants with limited capital. From Eq. 1
As noted, for Spain and Portugal, ( ) ( ), which implies .
We construct the left-hand side of this expression using government bond yields, swap rates, and CDS rates. When this relation is different from zero, we have a situation of market segmentation.
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The main issue in interpreting findings that > 0 for European sovereigns is the possibility that the CDS will not be triggered in the event of default or redenomination. Our discussion of the Greek case above highlighted some of the uncertainty surrounding CDS payouts in a restructuring.
11 A signature of market segmentation is violations of standard "arbitrage" pricing relations and the above expression is simply the negative of the "CDS-bond basis", a common measure of market segmentation. At the height of the US financial crisis, there were many cases of non-zero CDS-bond basis. Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011) study the basis over the US financial crisis for a cross-section of companies. They report large positive and negative bases. They also show that the basis, in the cross-section, correlates with measures of the transaction costs that impede arbitrage, such as funding costs, haircuts, and measures of counterparty risk. These findings suggest that the CDS-bond basis is a valid measure of the presence of market segmentation.
(Eq. 6) (Eq. 7) (Eq. 8) For Italy, measuring market segmentation is more challenging. We observe that if one takes the difference in eq. 7 across government bonds and corporate bonds, the redenomination component cancels out:
This comparison allows us to determine the impact of policy announcements on government bond market segmentation, as compared to that for corporate bonds. Thus, we can identify policy induced reduction in market segmentation to the extent that they do not also affect corporate bonds. This approach can also be implemented for Spain and Portugal. Table 7 presents the 2-day changes in the Euro swap rate (EONIA OIS) across the event dates. It is evident that the general change in interest rates across the event dates is small, especially compared to the changes in GIIPS sovereign bond yields. That is, the signaling and duration risk channels played a small role in the impact of ECB policies. Nevertheless, in the figures below, we plot yields on bonds as a spread over the swap rate to strip out the signaling and duration risk effects.
VI. Evidence for Channels
We next turn to more detailed evidence from Italian, Spanish and Portuguese asset prices attempting to shed light on the relative roles of default, redenomination, and segmentation channels in the impact of ECB policies on sovereign bond yields. Figure 4 plots the spreads for USD-denominated and EUR-denominated Italian government bonds maturing in 2015. We also plot the Italy CDS rates corresponding to the 2015 maturity date. It is apparent from the figure that default risk plays a dominant role in explaining the movements in bond yields. The CDS movements and bond-yield movements are of similar order of magnitude. The yield on the USD bond, which if anything should reflect less default risk than the EUR bond, is of similar magnitude as the EUR bond yield. We conclude from this data that default risk is the dominant driver of bond yields for Italy. The existence of default risk suggests that some of the SMP and OMT reduction in bond yields, as documented in Table 2 , is likely due to an effect of ECB actions in reducing default risk. We elaborate on the change in default risk on event dates in Table 8 which presents changes in government bond swap spreads ( -), CDS rates, and ( ) for Italy, (Eq. 9) 18 for 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year maturities. For both the SMP and OMT, the fall in CDS rates is almost as large as the fall in bond yields, suggesting that the dominant channel for the operation of ECB policies is the reduction of default risk. The table also shows that both the SMP, OMT and LTROs reduce ( ) for the 2-and 5-year bonds.
A. Italy
Figure 5 (blue) plots our measure of redenomination risk plus segmentation, ( ) ( ), where the default risk term is measured with CDS rates (which should not capture redenomination risk for Italy). In red, we also plot a series that uses as a default risk proxy. The most important observation from this plot -consistent with our conclusion above that the main driver of yields was default risk --is that the magnitudes of redenomination risk and segmentation effects are relatively small compared with the yield movements in Figure 4 . They are at most 1-2%. There is some indication that there was an increase in redenomination risk or segmentation prior to the second SMP date and the OMT, and a reduction on the second SMP event date. With regards to the policy channel for OMT, the picture is inconclusive regarding the role of redenomination plus segmentation, as the series that uses as default risk proxy suggests a larger role for reduced redenomination risk/segmentation than does the CDS-based series.
To shed additional light on the relative importance of redenomination risk and segmentation as policy channels, Figure 6 shows the time series of yields (minus the euro swap rate for similar duration) of corporate bonds in the Barclays yield index (duration approximately 5 years), an index of average 5-year CDS rates on Italian corporations, and the difference between the two.
12 Redenomination risk should affect for both sovereign and corporate bonds, but we see no substantial reductions in this series for corporate bonds around the second SMP date or around the OMT dates, whereas a modest reduction is apparent around the LTRO event dates. This further supports the conclusion that redenomination risk was not a significant component of yields for Italy and not an important channel of ECB intervention effects for Italy.
Many have commented on the high yields just before the LTRO and some have ascribed the peak in the blue line in Figure 5 ( for euro-denominated Italian bonds) to redenomination risk. See in particular Di Cesare, Grande, Manna and Taboga (2012). However, notice that the peak is not shared by the red line in Figure 4 . The most likely explanation for the difference is concerns about the possibility that CDS may not be triggered in a restructuring (the period just prior to and following the LTROs is the period where this was in flux for Greece as noted above). A Goldman Sachs note on Nov. 8 2012, Garzarelli (2012), raises this issue stating that ``The extra compensation embedded in government bond spreads (relative to CDS) could reflect the possibility of an FX redenomination, and that of a debt restructuring which would not trigger CDS. Separating these two sources of risk is non-trivial.'' The difference between the two lines in Figure 5 suggests that the issue of CDS contracts potentially not being triggered was likely substantial and thus that redenomination risk was not as high one would have feared based on the blue line ( ).
Figure 7 plots ( ) ( ) for a pair of Italian government bonds maturing in 2015 and for ENI (a large Italian oil and gas company) corporate bonds maturing in 2015 and 2020 (adjusted for ENI CDS rate differences corresponding to the 2015 and 2020 maturities).
13 Taking the ENI bonds, it appears that redenomination risk is at most about 1% in late 2011/early 2012. Importantly, the ENI series does not appear to decline substantially around the ECB event dates, again confirming that removal of redenomination risk is unlikely a big policy channel.
The movements in the government bond spread, relative to the corporate spread, as reflected in Figure 7 is likely evidence of a market segmentation effect. More precisely, the gap between the two lines measures [ ] [ ] as in eq. 9. Around the second SMP date and the first OMT date, the government spread falls much more than the corporate spread. In both SMP and OMT, ECB actions target EUR bonds and not USD bonds and thus likely drive down , suggesting a segmentation channel. This is consistent with the ECB stating ``dysfunctional'' markets as a central motivation for the SMP, although the ECB emphasized redenomination risk more for the OMT.
There is a segmentation effect also present around the LTRO period but it appears earlier than our first LTRO date. Notice how the spread in Figure 7 for government bonds falls significantly, from a peak of 83 bps on Nov. 9, 2011 to below -2 pct in late 2012. Over the same period the ENI spread does not change much. The LTRO increases the desirability of EUR bonds which are pledgeable as collateral at the ECB for LTRO loans and thus increases the demand for these bonds relative to the USD bond. Thus the excess reduction of the government bond spread indicates a segmentation-induced reduction in bond yields for sovereign bonds by more than 2% if one ascribes the full effect over this wider window to the LTROs. Substantial market 13 The driver of the difference in yields between EUR and USD bonds in Figure 6 is the currency in which they are denominated rather than the governing law. The USD bonds in Figure 7 are under foreign law, but we also examined ENI USD bonds issued under domestic law, and their yields are very similar to the foreign-law USD bonds. This indicates that any concerns that foreign or domestic debt might be in an advantage in a restructuring situation are not important for yields. 20 segmentation reduction from the LTROs would be consistent with our findings in Table 8 for the two LTRO event dates that the yield-swap-CDS values decline substantially. Figure 8 presents one more piece of evidence for the importance of segmentation effects during the LTRO period. We plot yield-swap-CDS (redenomination plus segmentation) for both 2 and 10 year maturity bonds. Since we have not found much evidence for reduced redenomination risk as a policy channel we interpret these series in terms of market segmentation. Since the LTRO provided banks a loan of up to 3-year maturity it was widely perceived to enable a carry trade of purchasing government bonds of under 3-year maturity financed by the ECB, via the LTROs. Thus, under the segmentation channel, the LTROs should have particularly affected 2-year bonds relative to 10-year bonds. The figure shows evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Prior to the LTROs, both spreads rise, which may reflect that many investors were liquidating bonds into a segmented market and thus pushing bond yields higher relative to CDS. The two year series peaks above the ten year series, but by the end of 2012 the spreads are similar and only the two-year series remains low for an extended period after this. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the ECB's loans gave banks incentives to particularly purchase 2-year bonds. The Wall Street Journal, quotes Intesa's Chairman Andrea Beltratti, "The new funds, which come with a 1% interest rate, will be used in part for a profitable trading strategy regarding Italian government bonds." He said the bank would mainly purchase Italian government bonds with maturities of three years or less, so that they match with the three-year duration of the ECB loans.'' [WSJ, Feb. 29, 2012] Overall we conclude from our analysis of Italy that: (a) Default risk was the dominant factor in driving Italian government bond yields and the dominant policy channel; (b) Market segmentation effects were also important for Italian government bonds and a secondary policy channel;; and (c) Redenomination risk may have been present at times (notably in the fall of 2011) but was not a substantial policy channel for any of the three policies we study.
B. Spain
Our conclusions for Spain are similar to those for Italy. ECB policies worked primarily through a default risk channel. The segmentation channel is second in terms of importance, although the evidence is less conclusive than the case of Italy. The redenomination risk channel played a minor role in the SMP and OMT, but likely played a role in the LTRO. Figure 9 plots the USD and EUR yield spreads, ( ), for a pair of Spanish government bonds maturing in 2013. For completeness, we also plot the 2013 CDS but remember that for Spain (and Portugal) it captures both default and redenomination risk and is thus harder to interpret. As with our analysis of Italy, the evidence suggests that the dominant factor driving yields is default risk since the dollar-denominated bonds (which are not subject to redenomination risk 21 and less affected by ECB-induced changes in market segmentation) have yields that are quite similar to those for the euro-denominated bonds.
Figure 10 graphs measures of redenomination risk for Spain. The plot on the right-hand side of Figure 10 shows ( ) ( ) for a pair of USD and EUR Spanish government bonds maturing in 2013. It also plots the same spread constructed from two corporate bonds. Unlike the case of Italy, we are unable to identify a corporation with outstanding USD and EUR bonds of similar maturity and with available yield data. Instead we use Abertis for the EUR bond and Telefonica for the EUR bond, adjusting the spread for the relative difference in CDS rates. That is, we construct the spread:
From this corporate spread, we conclude that redenomination risk is at most 1.5%, and this occurs in the spring of 2012. During the OMT period, redenomination risk is near zero and there does not appear to be a persistent fall in the series around the OMT.
The left-hand side plot in Figure 10 provides further evidence on redenomination risk. Following eq. 8, we calculate ( ) as a direct measure of redenomination risk. The level of this spread may be pushed towards negative values by concerns that CDS would not pay off in a restructuring event. Even so, the time series pattern of this series also shows no persistent fall in redenomination risk around the OMT. Figure 11 plots the Barclays corporate bond index for Spain (average duration about 4 years). Unlike for Italy, the index exhibits quite substantial drops around the LTRO and especially the OMT dates. These drops are not matched by similar drops in our corporate bond spread redenomination risk proxy in Figure 10 . This indicates that the corporate yield reductions are likely to have been driven by reduced default risk.
We next consider segmentation effects. The government spread in the right-hand side plot of Figure 10 is negative during the first SMP date, the LTRO dates, and the OMT period, suggesting market segmentation. Moreover, we can contrast the differential behavior of the government and corporate spreads in Figure 10 . We see large reductions in only the government spread around the LTRO period, suggesting a market segmentation effect. Figure 12 plots and (i.e. segmentation measures for both 2 and 10 year maturity bonds). As in the case of Italy, we see much stronger segmentation effects during the LTRO period for 2-year bonds. Table 8 presents changes in government bond yields ( ), swap rates ( ), and for Spain, for 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year maturities. Remember that or Spain (and Portugal), CDS cover redenomination losses, so the yield-swap-CDS variable in Table 8 has a clear interpretation as market segmentation. For the SMP, the reduction in bond yields is largely in line with the reduction in CDS, suggesting an important role for the default risk channel.
14 There is also an effect on , suggesting a possible segmentation effect. For the OMT, the evidence in Table  8 suggests that both default risk and segmentation channels play an important role. The effects on for Spain are large; too large (relative to Italy) to be reflective of concerns that the CDS will not cover default events, and thus likely due to market segmentation. For the LTROs, we find that bond yields fall while CDS rise, and bond yield reductions are thus driven by the policy reducing market segmentation.
C. Portugal
The evidence from Portugal is consistent with our findings for Spain and Italy. The default risk channel plays the central role, and the segmentation channel plays a secondary role. There is little role for the redenomination risk channel. Figure 13 plots the USD and EUR yield spreads, ( ), for a pair of Portuguese government bonds maturing in 2013 and 2014. We also plot the CDS rates corresponding to a 2015 maturity date. As with our analysis of Italy, the evidence suggests that the dominant factor driving yields is default risk since the dollar-denominated bonds (which are not subject to redenomination risk and less affected by ECB-induced changes in market segmentation) have yields that are quite similar to those for the euro-denominated bonds. Figure 14 , right panel, plots the maturity-matched Bond-Bill spread for Portugal. We link together a series of yields on 12-month T-Bills and we look for bonds that mature within four weeks of the T-Bill maturity dates. Even though this spread captures only very near-term default risk, it reaches levels of around 10 percent prior to the second SMP and the LTRO date. In the left panel, we plot the underlying bond and bill yields, and the graphs shows that the variation in default risk is a substantial portion of the variation in the bond yield. This is another piece of evidence that default risk was a major concern and that the second SMP (temporarily) and the LTRO sharply reduced it. The reduction post-LTRO is not shared by the CDS rates in Figure 13 , though. Apparently, the LTRO lowered the market's assessment of nearterm default risk, without much change to longer-term default concerns.
As the left-hand side plot in Figure 14 shows, even Treasury Bills reached yields close to 10 percent during the height of the crisis. Given the historical experience and established conventions for sovereign restructurings, this rise in yields is difficult to explain with standard 23 notions of default risk. One explanation could be that Treasury Bills are predominately held by a clientele of money market investors that is highly sensitive to rollover problems, even if these rollover problems might lead only to payment delay rather than a substantial loss of value. Figure 15 , right-hand side, plots ( ) ( ) for a pair of Portuguese government bonds maturing in 2015 and for Santander Totta, a large Portuguese bank, corporate bonds maturing in 2015. Santander Totta does not have any outstanding foreign currency bonds and so we match the EUR bonds with USD bonds of its Spanish parent, Santander. The evidence from the corporate bond series is that redenomination risk plays a minor role through the entire sample. The government spread is high prior to the second SMP date and briefly in 2012, peaking at almost 4%, suggesting a possible role for redenomination risk in only those periods. The left-hand side plot in Figure 15 plots ( ) as an alternative measure of redenomination risk. The pre-second-SMP and post-LTRO spikes also appear in this series, confirming a positive, but relatively small redenomination risk component of yields at those points in time.
We omit a corporate bond index plot for Portugal, because the Barclays index series ends in the middle of our sample period and it includes a very small number of bonds.
We next consider segmentation effects. The government spread in the right-hand side plot of Figure 15 is negative during the two SMP dates, the LTRO dates, and the OMT period, indicating market segmentation. The magnitudes are significant: The spread falls as low as -7% prior to the OMT. The corporate spread in Figure 15 largely mirrors these movements, unlike the corporate spreads that we examined for Italy and Spain. A potential reason could be that the corporate spread here is that of a bank, while those for Italy and Spain are non-financials. To the extent that sovereign and banks are viewed as closely linked, and their bonds are substitutes to a greater degree than sovereign bonds and non-financials, any segmentation effects that affect sovereign bond yields might spillover to a greater extent to bank bonds than to non-financials. Figure 16 shows and (i.e. segmentation spreads for both 2 and 10 year maturity bonds). As in the case of Italy, we see much stronger segmentation effects during the LTRO period for 2-year bonds. Table 8 presents changes in government bond yields ( ), swap rates ( ), and for Portugal, for 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year maturities. For the SMP, there are large and significant reductions in bond yields and CDS, suggesting a significant default/redenomination risk channel. There also appears a significant segmentation channel, given the movements in the CDS-Bond basis. These segmentation effects are also present during the OMT. For the LTRO, the data reveal that bond yields rose rather than fell.
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VII. Related Literature
There is a recent literature that has analyzed the effects of ECB interventions on yields. However, most of this literature does not assess the channels through which interventions affect bond yields, which is a central element of our paper.
Eser and Schwaab (2013) find that the SMP lowered yields on periphery bonds. Szczerbowicz (2012) use an event study methodology around ECB interventions and find that the SMP and OMT lowered covered bond spreads and periphery sovereign yields, while the main effects of the 3-year LTRO were on money market spreads and covered bond spreads. Falagiarda and Reitz (2013) study the surprise information content of many ECB communications throughout the crisis and find that they generally reduced the spread between Italian and German sovereign yields.
Other recent work focuses on the individual components of sovereign yield spreads related to solvency factors, redenomination risk, and market segmentation, but there is no other work that aims to disentangle these different factors. Di Cesare et al. (2012) use a model with fiscal and macroeconomic factors to argue that periphery sovereign bond yields during the height of the crisis were far above what can be explained by these fundamental factors. Based on several indicators, including the sovereign bond -CDS basis, they suggest that redenomination risk is substantial in the fall of 2011 whereas some of our analysis above indicated that redenomination risk in the fall of 2011 may not have been as large as the sovereign bond-CDS basis suggested. De Pooter et al. (2012) use bond yields and CDS to study the effects of SMP purchases within a search-model framework. Their estimates suggest that the SMP affected bond yields primarily through a (partly temporary) reduction in the illiquidity premium in yields. Corradin and Rodriguez-Moreno (2013) observe that USD-denominated eurozone sovereign bonds --including those of several core countries as well as Spain and Italy --traded at substantially higher yields than EUR-denominated bonds of the same issuer during the 2008-12 period and that the SMP and three-year LTRO programs contributed to a widening of the spread. They attribute the spread to the collateral and capital requirement benefits of EURdenominated bonds whereas we have also emphasized the importance of the ECB focusing its purchases on euro-denominated bonds. Trebesch and Zettelmeyer (2012) back out the ECB's purchases of Greek bonds in the SMP in 2010. They find that the ECB targeted bonds with high yields and the higher the amount purchased of a particular bond by the ECB, the higher the drop in yields in that instrument, while bonds that were not purchased by the ECB saw an increase, rather than a decrease in yields, indicating market segmentation effects.
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VIII. Conclusion
We began with the observation that European government bond yields have been high at various times from 2010 to 2013. Our analysis reveals that these high yields are primarily a result of solvency risk and secondarily a result of market segmentation factors. During the late 2011/early 2012 period we find that redenomination risks was a third factor that increased bond yields.
ECB actions have been successful in lowering government bond yields. Our evidence suggests that all three of the policies we have studied, the SMP, OMT, and 3-year LTROs, helped to reduce government bond yields, with larger effects for the SMP and OMT. The policies have worked by reducing sovereign default risk as well as through a market segmentation channel. In the LTRO period, policy likely also worked by reducing redenomination risk, with the clearest evidence for Portugal where our various approaches to measure redenomination risk agree on a role for reduced redenomination risk around the LTROs.
Importantly, we find that the ECB's policies have had beneficial macroeconomic spillovers. That is, ECB actions have not merely engineered transfers from core countries to GIIPS countries, as suggested by some observers. For the SMP and OMT we document these effects by measuring event-day stock returns, for both GIIPS and EMU countries, and reductions in corporate bond yields. For the LTROs, our event-study is unable to discern an effect on stock returns or corporate bond yields, and effects on sovereign yields are modest. This is likely because of the difficulty of identifying a date with only LTRO-relevant news. However, given that we find that the OMT and SMP have had spillovers and reduced government bond yields, and given that the LTROs also induced purchases (by banks) of government bonds, it is likely that the LTROs have had beneficial spillovers as well.
An important question that our data does not address is why the ECB actions have had beneficial spillovers. We conclude by discussing some answers to this question.
Consider first our finding that ECB actions reduced default risk. This could mean: (a) There is a large fiscal multiplier, and if ECB actions signaled future fiscal transfers to the GIIPS countries, the beneficial spillovers are a result of the fiscal multiplier. (b) There is an important bank capital channel for lending, and by increasing the prices of government bonds, the ECB actions engineer an increase in bank capital and hence credit supply. (c) The government solvency risk is a multiple equilibrium phenomena, and a result of the two-way feedback between lenders' rollover decisions and default risk. ECB actions have helped to choose the good equilibrium. (d) The countries suffer a debt overhang problem, as in Myers (1977) or Krugman (1988) , with the 26 ECB actions effectively reducing the debt burden on the country (via lower interest rates), and hence lead to better macroeconomic policies.
If the underlying problem is (a), then a more direct alternative to ECB actions is expansionary fiscal policy. If the problem is (b), then a more direct policy is bank recapitalization. If the problem is (c), then the appropriate action is direct purchases of government debt and commitments to purchase more debt, as the ECB has done. If the problem is (d), then a more appropriate solution than those the ECB has pursued is sovereign debt restructuring.
Consider next our finding that ECB actions worked through a segmentation channel. For this channel to have beneficial spillovers, we also need an underlying problem such as (b), (c), or (d).
In each of these cases, by lowering bond yields, ECB actions result in beneficial macroeconomic outcomes. Our conclusions regarding alternative policy actions are the same as above.
Finally, consider our finding that ECB actions may have reduced redenomination risk. This could have spillover effects through (b), (c), or (d). If redenomination risk is an important channel, then commitments by the ECB or the government to never redenominate, such as the OMT, are effective. Again, there are alternative actions that more directly address the underlying problems. The table is based on banks that both provided data to the EBA's 2011 stress tests and were publicly traded on the particular event date. The number of banks varies between 34 and 37 across event dates. We calculate implied stock returns based on reported holdings of each of the GIIPS countries' sovereign bonds by maturity bucket, along with our documented yield changes by maturity from Table 2 . Yield-swap-CDS, 2-year Yield-swap-CDS, 10-year
